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CALCULATING PRIVACY PRESERVING REACH  
USING HYPERLOGLOG SKETCHES 
ABSTRACT 
Methods for measuring cross media content exposure across multiple publishers in a 
privacy preserving way are disclosed.  The solutions described can accommodate publishing 
platforms that vary in size and computational resources without hindering performance or 
accuracy.  Proposed is a solution to implement a privacy-safe HyperLogLog sketch 
implementation that can be applied to the cross media content exposure problem, as well as other 
problems that require privacy safe multi-set cardinality estimation.  The processes described 
herein include publishers constructing encrypted HyperLogLog sketches and transmitting the 
encrypted sketches to worker computing devices, the worker computing devices joining the 
encrypted sketches, the worker computing devices finding the minimum value of each register in 
the joined sketch, and summing the registers to compute the multi-set cardinality estimate. 
SUMMARY 
Measuring cross media content reach across multiple content publishers in a privacy 
preserving way can be challenging.  Content publishing platforms vary in size and computational 
resources, meaning effective solutions must accommodate limited computational resources and 
capabilities. 
When computing multiparty set cardinality, the size of the data structure can scale with 
the size of the number of client devices in the set, which can impose a large computational 
overhead on all participants proportional to the largest publisher.  This means a small publisher 
that serves a smaller amount of content would have to pay the same computational cost as a 
publisher that serves a very large amount of content. 
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The HyperLogLog algorithm can be used to estimate the cardinality of multisets, for 
example sets of user identifiers from different content publishers.  HyperLogLog can estimate 
the cardinality of a multiset of uniformly distributed random numbers by calculating the number 
of leading zeros in a binary representation of each number in the set.  For example, if the 
maximum number of leading zeros observed is n, the estimate of the number of distinct elements 
in the set can be 2n.  To obtain the multiset of uniformly distributed numbers, at least one hash 
function can be applied to each member in the set. 
HyperLogLog can implement a data structure that can be used in the estimation of the 
cardinality of multisets of many different sizes, including large and very large multisets.  
HyperLogLog can be easy to implement, have a small space overhead, and a very low error rate.  
However, without additional processing, HyperLogLog may not preserve privacy of the entries 
of the multiset.  The systems and methods described herein can use HyperLogLog while 
protecting privacy without sacrificing the accuracy of the estimation for large datasets. 
Techniques based on HyperLogLog implementations can estimate cardinality on large 
multisets.  HyperLogLog sketches from multiple sources can be computationally efficient to 
combine because they can be combined using a constant number of max operations.  The 
systems and methods detailed herein describe techniques that allow for make each HyperLogLog 
sketch to be made private before sharing, without destroying the accuracy of the cardinality 
estimate.  HyperLogLog sketches are favorable because they are easy to implement, have good 
accuracy, have low space requirements and are very scalable, thereby improving the performance 
of cardinality estimating computer systems. 
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DESCRIPTION 
The systems and methods of this technical solution can allow each publisher to generate a 
HyperLogLog sketch, and then transform the sketch into a different format that can be encrypted 
with an additive homomorphic scheme (e.g., using ElGamal encryption, etc.).  Content 
publishers can send their encrypted HyperLogLog sketches to semi-trusted workers that all must 
work together to combine the HyperLogLog sketches, and compute the reach estimate in a way 
that protects the user identifiers used to generate each publisher's HyperLogLog sketch. The cost 
imposed on publishers in this scheme is a small constant amount of encryptions that can be 
independent of the size of other publishers, or the number of possible user identifiers.  This small 
cost (e.g., seconds of CPU time and MBs of storage, etc.) cab allow small publishers (e.g., 
publishers with a small number of user identifiers, a small amount of computational resources, 
etc.) to participate in the system. 
The systems and methods described herein for combining HLLs in homomorphic space 
can utilize a reformulation of the estimation equation used in HyperLogLog.  The systems and 
methods described herein can transform the sum of small floating point numbers to a sum of 
integer values so that it can be computed homomorphically in ciphertext.  This can allow the 
system to compute the estimate using the HyperLogLog sketches without revealing sensitive 
pieces of information (e.g., user identifiers, other metadata, etc.) from any HyperLogLog sketch. 
The process for doing so is described below. 
In some implementations, HyperLogLog, the most significant bit of each register can be 
stored because the exponentiation only needs to be computed at the time of estimation. 
Homomorphic addition is much simpler than homomorphic exponentiation. So it is desirable to 
change the registers to store full integer values of the terms in Z. Since M[ j ] is an integer value 
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between 0 and L - k, we can make a common denominator of all the terms in the summation 




Another way to think about this is term in the sum Z is a floating point number 
representable in binary with exactly one 1.  Multiplying by 2^(L-k) would turn such a value into 
an integer.   
 
The sum of registers can then be expressed as the sum of integers divided by a constant 
without loss of precision.  Creating the union of HyperLogLog sketches can be performed by 
choosing the max of the most significant bit value in each register.  When representing register 
values as integers, as described herein, the systems and methods of this technical solution can 
determine the minimum value of each register.  To compute the cardinality of the union, the 
systems and methods of this technical solution can compute sums across registers, and mins 
within registers across HyperLogLog sketches.  The systems and methods of this technical 
solution provide at least two techniques for computing cross publisher reach.  At least one 
5
Defensive Publications Series, Art. 4177 [2021]
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/4177
technique is based on the Paillier crypto system.  At least one other technique based on Ring 
Learning with Errors.   
Each technique described herein can include at least these steps: 
1. Constructing encrypted HyperLogLog sketches by publisher computing devices, 
and sending those encrypted HyperLogLog sketches to worker computing devices; 
2. Joining, by at least one worker computing device, the encrypted HyperLogLog 
sketches; 
3. Finding, by at least one worker computing device, the minimum value of each 
register; 
4. Summing, by at least one worker computing device, the registers to compute an 
estimate; and 
5. Revealing, by at least one worker computing device, the estimate. 
The techniques described in this technical solution can be applied in scenarios where 
multiple parties want a count of data items across them without revealing information about the 
items themselves.  For example, hospitals counting incidents of diseases. 
A description of the HyperLogLog algorithm is described herein in brief overview.  A 
HyperLogLog sketch comprises m registers, where m = 2k, which can be initialized to an 
initialization value (e.g., zero).  An item (e.g., data entry, collection of binary data, etc.) can be 
added to a HLL by using a hash function, H, that produces L character long bit strings.  The first 
k characters of the hash can be used as an index for a register, M.  The register can store the 
6
Frye et al.: CALCULATING PRIVACY PRESERVING REACH USING HYPERLOGLOG SKETCHES
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2021
position of the most significant bit of the remaining L - k bits, if it is greater than what is already 
present. 
 
It can be easy to union HyperLogLog sketches from the same user identifier space.  The 
systems and methods described herein can select the maximum value across all HyperLogLog 
sketeches for each register. 
 
Each register can be an approximation of the cardinality.  The cardinality estimate E can be the 
harmonic mean given by the following Equation: 
 
In the above equation, m is the number of registers, am is a constant and Z is a sum determined by 
the values in the registers, M[*], given by the following equation. 
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The space for a HyperLogLog sketch can grow in proportion to the Log(Log(n)), where n is the 
cardinality of the multiset.  The final estimate of an HLL can have relative error proportional to 
the number of registers, given by the following expression. 
 
The systems and methods of this technical solution can compute the cardinality of the union of 
HyperLogLog sketches from different publishers while protecting the privacy of the user 
identifiers in each HyperLogLog sketch.  The systems and methods described herein can merge 
the HyperLogLog sketches from each publisher, and the Z of the merged HyperLogLog sketches 
can be computed using homomorphic properties of an encryption system.  The systems and 
methods of this technical solution can compute the cross-publisher cardinality without revealing 
the registers from any single publisher’s HyperLogLog sketch.  Z can be a non-constant term,  
the only term in E that is not constant, thus homomorphically computing Z would give us E.  
Paillier Based Solution 
The systems and methods of this technical solution can implement a paillier based solution.  In 
such implementations, the publisher computing devices can be assumed to be honest but curious.  
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 D(E(x) * E(y) mod n2) = x + y mod n 
 D(E(x) y mod n2) = xy mod n 
Given a list of cipher texts the systems and methods described herein can find the minimum 
value without revealing the values themselves. This can be done by pairwise tests of inequality.  
Such protocols describe a way for parties A and B with secrets a, and b respectively to test if a < 
b without revealing a or b. This can be done using the homomorphic properties of Paillier as well 
as limiting the values that can be encrypted to n/2 rather than n. 
A simple overview of a less than comparison. 
1. A: computes Enc(a) and sends to B 
2. B chooses random numbers 0 <= r’ <= r 
3. B: computes Enc(c) = Enc(a) r ꞏ Enc(−r ꞏ b + r ′ ) = Enc(r ꞏ a − r ꞏ b  r ′ ). 
4. A: Dec(Enc(c)) = r ꞏ a − r ꞏ b - r ′  
a. The decrypted value is a random number, but if it is less than n/2 the a - b > 0 
otherwise a - b <= 0. 
 
For a list of N ciphertexts, A and B can find one of the minimum ciphertexts by doing O(N) 
comparisons.  The plaintext values may not be revealed, but a partial ordering is.  Supporting the 
equality test can implement cutting the message space into a positive and negative sets.  The 
divided plaintext space cam be large enough to include the maximum difference of values being 
compared, cubed.  For example, a HyperLogLog with a 64 bit hash a k = 14 that is: 
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The protocol can make use of a version of the Paillier encryption scheme with thresholds.  The 
steps of the protocol can include 
1. Constructing Encrypted HyperLogLog sketches (at publishers) and sending to workers 
2. Joining Encrypted HyperLogLog sketches 
3. Shuffling to hide the index of registers and the association of registers to the publisher. 
4. Finding the min value of each register. 
5. Summing registers to reveal the value Z which is used to compute E. 
6. Noise is added to the final estimate before releasing outside of workers. 
 
Setup: 
1. A threshold Paillier key is created and each worker gets a share of a share of the secret 
key for decrypting values. The public key is shared with all publishers. 
 
Computing E from multiple HyperLogLog sketches: 
1. Each publisher computes a HyperLogLog sketch using 214 registers and a 64 bit hash 
function. 
2. Before sharing HyperLogLog sketches, publishers store 250-msb. 
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3. Publishers encrypt each register value using Paillier encryption. Each register value is 
encrypted with the public key. The publishers then send the encrypted HyperLogLog 
sketch registers to a single worker.  In some implementations, the system can distribute 
among all workers, and combine. 
4. For each register, the worker creates a list of all encrypted values from all the publishers 
by joining them together. 
 
5. Register identifiers are discarded and each worker can shuffle the ordering of the list of 
registers as well as order of each encrypted value in the registers. The cipher text values 
of the values can change at each worker so the association of register values to publishers 
is not known to any worker. The systems and methods of this technical solution can re-
encrypt the messages, that is to use the homomorphic property and add an encrypted zero 
to the cipher text. 
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1. Considering a different model where workers could be dishonest, this shuffle 
would be sufficient to remove the link of MSB value to register and publisher as 
long as one worker is honest. There are some schemes to do a verifiable shuffle. 
 
6. Workers can perform a reduce operation on the values in register lists via a pairwise 
inequality test of encrypted messages to see if X < Y. Because both rows and columns 
have been permuted learning the result of X < Y will not reveal anything about values 
from publishers. This reduce operation is easy to run in parallel, each worker could be in 
charge of finding the mins for a subset of the rows. In summary a single operation of the 
reduce is done by: 
1. The worker choose two random numbers r and r’ s.t.  0 <= r’ < r 
2. Computes an inequality test for X and Y, and its share of the decryption of t 
 
3. Decrypts t with its secret share of key 
4. Send t to all other workers to decrypt 
5. Each worker sends its portion of the decryption Ci to Wn 
6. At Wn, the message t can be decrypted which is a random number that only 
indicates the sign of the subtracted terms. If Dec(t) < n / 2 then x - y was a 
positive value meaning x > y, so Wn tells W1 to keep Y, otherwise Wn tells W1 to 
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keep X. We don’t actually know if X == Y but for finding the min value such a 
distinction is not needed. 
 
7. At the beginning of this step we have the minimum values for each of the rows still 
encrypted.  Once the minimum value has been discovered for all the registers in the HLL, 
sum all registers values in ciphertext. 
 
8. Divide 250 by the decrypt summed result to get the value Z, which is used to compute E. 
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1. If E < 5m, Correct for the bias using HyperLogLogNo_Bias which can be based on 
empirical results for the values for E and m. 
2. Add noise to the estimate so the final result is differentially private. The 
sensitivity after bias correction is low. 
 
 
Privacy and Security 
 The sum of the registers, Z, can be revealed to the computation.  No single register value 
nor its association with a publisher is revealed. 
 This Z value has information about what is in some register for the combined 
HyperLogLog sketches.  In particular, this final sum is a 64 bit number, where the 
probability of bits being set is linked back to the minimum register value. This means 
each bit of the integer in the final sum reveals information with higher probability than 
the previous bit. 
 The register values from all publishers are grouped into lists. Then the order of the lists, 
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Non-limiting Example Data  
 
Example Simulation 
In this section, described are various example simulations that implement some or all of the 
techniques described herein.  These implementations are purely example and should not be 
considered as limiting in any way. 
Described herein are simulations implemented to execute on one machine and one CPU.  
Because the size of a HyperLogLog sketch is fixed regardless of the size of the multiset being 
estimated the simulation may not include making interesting and diverse sets. 
 
Setup of example simulation: 
1. There are three workers all with a share of a Paillier secret key. Secret key was generated 
by a trusted authority (although it could be done without such an authority). 
2. 3 Publishers have HyperLogLog sketches with varying sizes, 1k 24k and 0. There was no 
overlap in elements between any HyperLogLog sketches.  
3. Each publisher creates and encrypts their HyperLogLog sketch and sends it to one worker 
for combining.  Sending can include passing to the EncryptedHLLTable class. 
4. Each worker shuffles the table rows / cols while re-encrypting each element 
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5. One worker starts the min discovery by creating test messages which are partially 
decrypted by all workers, but only the last one sees all the shares. In a prod 
implementation this step would be done in parallel with a random worker assignments for 
discovering the min of each row. 
6. All minimum values are summed homomorphically. And used to estimate cardinality 
using HLLno_bias as described herein. This does not require knowing any of the register 
values, just the final estimation. 
 
The estimated cardinality was the same when merging in the clear and when merging via the 
MPC. Both came out to 25090.78 which is off the true value by 0.36% 
 
Publishers have a single sketch which is encrypted and sent to a worker. Their total resource use 
per sketch is 2^14 encryptions which takes ~2.6 seconds on a single CPU for a total encrypted 
sketch size of just under 5 Mb. These numbers are constant with respect to the number of 
workers and publishers. 
 
Workers see a combined sketch table that is #publishers * size per sketch, so 15 mb in this test. 
Each of the steps has a different amount of resource utilization 
 Shuffling to hide which registers belong to which publisher. 
o Each worker re-encrypts the messages in the combined HLL table and shuffles the 
rows / cols. 
 Finding the min value of each register and summing 
o This requires creating 2^14 * 3 min test messages and decrypting all of them. 
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The time values in the table below are wall clock time values for each step when running on 1 






Shuffle Summing Mins 




56.4 min (19 min) 




6.2 h (2.08 hours) 




DNF - A guess would be in the range of 39 hours 
(13 hours) since there is roughly a 6.5X increase 
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The table below shows the performance of an example Paillier implementation.  Times are all in 
milliseconds and were measured as averages the wall clock time of running on a single CPU over 
thousands of operations. 
 
Key Size Encryption Decrypt a share Combine shares Enc  x < y 
1024 bits 0.15 31.7 1.62 4.72 
2048 bits 0.61 224.8 5.89 16.7 
4096 bits 2.31 1542.8 26.9 70.0 
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